1 In private correspondence, Ben-Porath pointed out that his assumption about loan rates does not preclude the exogenous rates from varying for different individuals. However, in this paper, we define "imperfection" to be a divergence in the borrowing rate for financing educational investment and other rates.
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Schultz (1961, p. 4) states: "It is indeed elementary to stress the greater imperfection of the capital market in providing funds for investment in human beings than for investment in physical capital." Concurring, Friedman (1962, p.102) states: "Investment in human capital cannot be financed on the same terms or with the same ease as investment in physical capital." Indeed, for some students it is held that the loan price is so high that one can in effect say that loan funds do not exist. Thus, Friedman and Kuznets (1954, p. vi) in an earlier work state: "The economic stratification of the population is important because capital invested in professional training, unlike capital invested in factories and machines, can rarely be obtained in the open market; it must be provided by the prospective practitioner himself, his parents, or a benefactor."
If no loans are available to the individual for educational investment, the separation theorem can be retained only by artifact. That is, to retain equivalence of maximizing present value of income and utility, one must now assume that borrowing rates for individual consumption (or other types of investment) are exogenous and equal to the lending rate. As Becker (1964) points out, such an assumption is a bit specious, because the borrower has some freedom to convert funds to alternative uses. However, much consumer borrowing is for durables (autos, houses, appliances) and the lender frequently retains title, thus precluding conversion. Whatever the value of these remarks, we proceed by maximizing the present value of the rental flow of human capital, and, as a consequence of our "no educational loans" assumption, we have less cause for invoking the separation theorem than did Ben-Porath.
We agree with a reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper that retention of the separation theorem with divergence of lending-borrowing rates is a luxury. And we agree with another reviewer that zero borrowing for schooling is not descriptive. The "truth" lies somewhere between, and choice thus depends on individual time preference. Since our assumptions lead to an implication that the length of schooling is greater for every case than the length of schooling in the Ben-Porath model, bias runs in the same direction for both models. That is, divergence in borrowing-lending rates that dictates choice via intertemporal utility leads to the possibility that some individuals would fail to invest, assuming, of course, that the borrowing rate exceeds the lending rate rather than vice versa.
The objectives we attempt to achieve in this paper should be viewed as intermediate steps en route to confronting these models with data. To date, most empirical effort guided by the Ben-Porath-type model has been directed toward earnings data.2 The solutions given here and the resulting reduced form equations have implications for alternative data.
II. A Ben-Porath-Type Model with No Loans for Educational Investment
What follows is a presentation and analysis of a human capital accumulation model similar to Ben-Porath's except for the loan market assumption. For expository purposes, it is necessary to duplicate some of the BenPorath discussion.
An individual is assumed to arrive at a specified age, to, with an acquired and exogenous stock of human capital, Eo. The question of units of measurement for Et, the stock of human capital at time t, is begged.
It is a stock of "Eds" from which rental earnings may flow. Potential earnings are Yt* = RE, t to)
and it is assumed that the individual has acquired no assets at initial time other than his stock of human capital. The rental rate, R, is fixed. The individual can add to his human capital stock, thereby augmenting potential earnings. Assume that the gross addition to "Eds" is technically constrained by a Cobb-Douglas production function,
where flo, fil, and f2 are positive and scale (i.e., f13 + #2) is less than unity.' The symbol Qt represents the gross addition to human capital in time t; Kt is that part of Et used to augment human capital as opposed to earning an immediate cash flow; and Dt is other educational inputs taken as a bundle.
The price of educational inputs is taken to be exogenous and fixed through time. The price of a unit of D is denoted by the symbol P. The opportunity cost of K is the rental rate, R. Hence, net earnings is potential earnings net of investment in schooling. That is, net earnings, Y, is
We assume that educational inputs must be purchased out of current cash flow. That is, contrary to the Ben-Porath assumption that the individual can defray outlay for tuition, books, etc., by borrowing, we assume that net earnings are always nonnegative. Thus, a constraint that must be met is Y = g2(t), t > to, (4) where g(t) is any arbitrary differentiable real time function.4
Note that (4) implies Et > Kt, since R, P, and Dt are nonnegative.5 Assuming that human capital deteriorates at a constant rate in the absence of augmentation, the net addition to the human capital stock is governed by Et = Qt6Et, 0 < 6 < 1,
where the dot notation indicates a time derivative and 6 is the rate of deterioration of the human capital stock. It is assumed that there is a fixed endpoint in time, t,, at which the individual retires. This implies that R, the rental rate on human capital, jumps to zero at time t,.
Finally, it is assumed that the individual faces an exogenous market rate of interest, r, at which he can loan or borrow for consumption purposes, and the objective is assumed to be that of maximizing the present value of net earnings, given the restrictions as stated. That is, the objective is to maximize 
, IpfloflIKP lD 2 = R(e-rt - 
2g(t)A2t = 0.
Note that equations (11) and (12) are simply restatements of the constraints. Equations (9) and (10) are "value of marginal product equals factor price" equations. Equation (8) 
f3I + 12
Substituting (17) and (18) and where a is the elasticity of substitution 1/(1 + /). A similar generality holds in Phase II, as noted by the same reviewer (see n. 14 below). The reasons for working with the Cobb-Douglas are to preserve manageable closed forms for relating the length of formal schooling to parameters and to facilitate comparison with similar closed forms implicit in the Ben-Porath model. 1 1 Since the net accumulation of human capital is at the rate Q, -5Et, and optimal Q, in Phase I is 1Et -A, the requirement that p be larger than 6Eo is simply a requirement that the initial optimal gross rate of capital accumulation be larger than deterioration. Thus, Phase I, if it exists at all, is a period of positive net additions to the stock of human capital.
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where the superscript on E, indicates Phase I and where t*, which marks the end of the period of specialization in the production of human capital, remains to be determined.
From (22), the general shape of human capital accumulation during Phase I can be discerned. The stock begins at E0 and, given the existence of a specialization phase, monotonically increases to an upper asymptote, the upper asymptote being (s/6) l/A* The path of accumulation has the potential of passing through a point of inflection.
Via equations (17) 
Re rtlt + Alt = 0.
As previously noted, A l t is the shadow price of a unit of produced "Eds." Since at time t. it is assumed that the rental rate on human capital goes to zero, it follows that the shadow price of produced "Eds" goes to zero at t. 12 This furnishes an integrating constant for the general solution to equation (25) 
Using equation (26) in conjunction with the two VMP curves, (23) and (24), the optimal time path for the part of educational stock diverted 12 In variational calculus language, educational stock is not constrained to be any particular value at final time; hence its "perturbation" is not zero at t", so the transversality condition implies that Al, evaluated at t, must be zero (see Sage 1968 An optimal path for Dt in Phase II can be similarly determined. The differential equation describing the optimal Et" path is difficult to integrate but can be handled.'5 However, it is not vital to our purposes and will be omitted from consideration here.
D. End of the Period of Specialization
At the point t = t*, it must be true that the optimal stock of human capital, Ef, in Phase I coincides with E[' in Phase II. At the point t = t*, equation (17) The function on the left-hand side of (31) is an increasing function in t*, and the right-hand side is a decreasing function in t*. parameters constant, decreases the length of the period of specialization in the production of human capital. 7 This result may seem inconsistent with casual observation, for one would expect to find a positive correlation between, say, parental schooling or income and length of time spent in school by the offspring. There is an explanation for this apparent anomaly. First, the effect under discussion is partial; ability (as reflected by the parameters of the production function) and the price of schooling inputs are held constant. Students with higher ability also will tend to have a larger initial stock of human capital; thus, simple and partial correlations may have opposite signs. Similarly, parents with larger resources may subsidize their child's education for longer periods, thereby lowering the price of educational inputs. In addition, since institutions of higher education use nonprice rationing, the supply of schooling to an individual is likely to be influenced by both his ability and his achievement prior to enrollment. The reduced form under discussion here is a demand function. Finally, it should be reiterated that education in these models is not treated as a consumer good-for either the individual or his family. Again, with reference to figure 1, a lengthening of work life, t., has the effect of shifting the Phase II function upward without affecting the path of human capital accumulation in Phase I. Thus, a postponing of retirement has the partial effect of lengthening the period of "formal schooling."
Other partial effects are more difficult to visualize with the aid of figure 1. For example, changes in the rate of deterioration, 3, the rentalprice ratio, R/P, and the production function parameters affect the functions in both phases. Thus, an increase in the rental-price ratio, R/P, shifts both functions upward. This increase in R/P clearly increases discounted future earnings, but its effect on length of schooling is less clear. However, use of the implicit-function theorem establishes the result that the partial effect of increasing the rental-price ratio increases the period of specialization.
Other partial effects that can be established analytically from equation ( Equations (31) and (32) were solved for several specific parameter sets to obtain some partial comparisons; the numerical results are given in Section V. Table 2 contains the values of parameters for which equations (31) and (32) were solved for t* and z.18 The following considerations were a guide to choosing the values in table 2: i) Since only the price ratio R/P is relevant, no generality is lost in fixing R at unity. Thus, "Eds" can be thought of as being identical to potential earnings. In particular, the reader can think of initial stock of "Eds," E0, as potential annual earnings in dollars at initial time. Units of Dt are as arbitrary as units of Kt. However, varying the price ratio RIP around unity implies a D measure in annual units roughly the same as K. For example, in Phase I, when net income is zero and R/P and 31/f2 are unity, then D = K = 4E in the no-loans model.
V. Some Numerical Comparisons
ii) Values for human capital deterioration were picked close to those reported in Johnson (1970) , and values for r were chosen in a range that seemed reasonable for real rates of return to nonhuman capital. Both r and 6 are continuous discount rates; therefore, annual discrete equivalents would be slightly larger than the r and 6 values in table 2.
iii) Values of fl and /32 were chosen to sum to 2. This allows a simple solution to the differential equation governing potential and net earnings during Phase II.9 iv) The parameter, tn, represents expected years of productive life. That is, if the individual is assumed to make his choice at age 18, say, then tn = 50 implies retirement at age 68.
v) The parameter P3o is chosen to crudely represent "ability." The value 40 was chosen so that the individual would realize an initial gross 18 Richard Brook developed the solution programs. 19 Two reviewers of an earlier draft suggested some discussion of earnings profiles implicit in the parameter sets. internal rate of return of about 50 percent when f1 = I2 = 4, R/P = 1, and Eo = 3,000. (Initial production, Q0, would be about 1,500 for this set of values.) Variations above and below 40 represent variations from a ''norm' of a Hicks-neutral "ability" measure.
Results of the numerical comparisons were as follows: i) Length of specialization in the Ben-Porath model, T, was uniformly smaller than the period of zero net earnings in the no-loans case (t*). As noted previously, this result has general validity, since with a no-loan restriction the individual can increase his capital stock at a faster rate during the specialization phase.
ii) Both T and t* varied directly with f#05 R/P, and t. and inversely with 3, r, and Eo. At least for the initial human capital stock (EO), generality can be claimed for the Ben-Porath model.
iii) For the parameter sets chosen, an increase in /B1 with scale fixed has ambiguous effects on t*, depending on the price ratio, R/P. In Table 3 gives potential earnings (Yr*) and net earnings (Y1) streams for maximum and minimum t*'s and i's and their corresponding parameter sets, assuming to = 18.
At least for the parameter sets represented in table 3, peak earnings were rather insensitive to loans versus no-loans educational investment. In constrast, length of "full time schooling" is quite sensitive to the loan market assumption. Thus, the major difference in earnings streams for two individuals having equal opportunity other than access to loans during "formal schooling" lies in the early part of work life. Of course, discounted value of earnings at the time of decision favors the individual having access to educational loans, but earnings tend to converge later. of "formal schooling" to market, endowment, and ability parameters. The form of the relationship is invariant within the class of homogeneous production processes for augmenting human capital stock except for the manner in which the rental-price ratio, R/P, enters as a determining factor. Thus, the equation may serve as a guide to functional forms and to choosing determining variables in empirical investigation of time spent in school or age of labor force entry. It was established analytically that the length of "formal schooling" varies directly with the length of work life and inversely with a market rate of discount, r, and the initial stock of human capital. For a CobbDouglas production function, it is also generally valid that the rentalprice ratio, R/P, affects the length of "formal schooling" in a positive direction; a similar directional effect holds for a Hicks-neutral "ability" index. An experiment involving several specific parameter sets indicated that length of "formal schooling" varies inversely with rate of deterioration of human capital.
A similar reduced form was derived for the original Ben-Porath (1967) set of assumptions. The period of specialization is always shorter for individuals with access to educational loans but who otherwise face identical market, endowment, and technical data. It is generally true that a larger initial endowment of human capital shortens length of specialization in the Ben-Porath case. Other results based on a comiputational experiment indicate that the individual with access to educational loans specializes longer for larger rent-price ratios (RIP), smaller interest and deterioration rates (r and 3), longer work life, and greater "ability" in the Hicks-neutral sense. Thus, the directional effects of these parameter changes on length of "formal schooling" are invariant for the two models, at least over the range of parameter space considered.
The numerical experiment indicated that length of specialization is sensitive to the loan market assumption. However, earnings streams were mainly affected in early life, with peak earnings (both potential and net) being quite comparable for both assumptions, other things equal. 
